philosophers, from Spinoza on, have emphasized the thought-dependence of emotions. The connection is not always easy and direct: but the process of psychoanalysis, -of all schools and versions -is based on the existence of such connections even where they are not easily accessible. Without it a "talking cure" aimed at emotional change would make no sense. 2 Such considerations have inspired existentialist attempts to show that emotions are judgements or courses of behaviour directly liable to assessments of rationality. 3 The implausibility of these attempts lies in their extremism: they leave no room for any accommodation with the dominant view. We need a perspective capable of assimilating the grounds of both traditions. My aim here is to make a beginning at sorting out the issues involved.
RATIONALITY
It would be convenient to start with an analysis of rationality. But this is such a fundamental concept that what is proffered as analysis generally turns out to be ideological manifesto. So I shall try to make do without such an attempt. Nevertheless, we need some idea of what has to be true of states that can be assessed for rationality. I shall formulate three theses, for which I give only the barest arguments. They entail plausible constraints on the objects of rationality assessments, and I shall proceed on the assumption that they are true. But the reader who finds them contentious can take them simply as circumscribing the notion of rationality which I am presupposing. If this notion turns out to be helpful in the present context, that will be so much in its favour. In formulating these theses, I am guided by what seems true of the paradigm objects of rationality assessments: actions, beliefs, and wants. Later I shall examine their applicability to emotions.
(i) Teleology: cognitive and strategic. Rationality is always a teleological concept. Anything that we speak of as rational or irrational, we so designate in the light of some function or end. An act is irrational if it tends to frustrate its ostensible or ultimate goal, or the agent's. A want can be said to be irrational in the light of other wants claiming precedence in a hierarchy of wants and ends. A belief is irrational if it is unlikely to be true, or if it was arrived at in a way that in general is not conducive to the acquisition of true beliefs (or the avoidance of false ones).
This way of putting things with regard to belief presupposes that we can make sense of something like epistemic utility: in terms of this we assess the rationality of judgements as if they were acts. This is a well explored and useful point of view; 4 but it is not incompatible with the fact that our "epistemic ends" have, programmed into us by nature, a measure of autonomy from other ends. Evolution is a rule-utilitarian, not an actutilitarian process. The value of truth -epistemic utility -is no doubt in general subordinate to less abstract biological ends; but in particular cases it is not assessed in terms of any direct common measure with those ends. I propose to mark this relative independence by labelling two sorts of rationality: the cognitive, applicable directly to judgements and beliefs, and the strategic, applicable primarily to actions or wants.
(ii) Intentionality. Appropriateness to a goal is not a sufficient condition of rationality. For consider organs of the body: they are, by and large in thriving species, appropriate to their function. And if there were a god it would have been rational of it to endow animals with lungs and livers if it intended that they should thrive. But that does not make the functioning of lungs and livers rational, nor does it make it rational of those organisms to have those organs. It is primarily individuals who are assessed for rationality, and it is in respect of their intentional states that they are so assessed. This is my second thesis: the teleology implied in rationality applies only to intentional states. 5 Here it may be objected that acts, which are among my paradigms of entities assessable for rationality, are not intentional states. True, insofar as acts are not states. So let us modify the prescription to read: "intentional states or events." Acts are at least intentional events, in this sense: any act, if it is to be distinguished from a mere occurrence befalling the "agent," must be characterized in terms of intentional states: in terms, that is, of the beliefs and intentions in the light of which it is the act that it is claimed to be.
(iii) Minimal Rationality. It is precisely in connection with this aspect of actions that my third thesis is most readily explained. It is this: Any intentional state amenable to criticism in terms of canons of rationality must be describable by some true description which represents the state as rational. I shall refer to this as the condition of minimal rationality. It needs some explanation and defence.
The case is clearest with respect to actions. To label an event an action, is to attribute to it a want set and a belief set as determining factors. The want set determines the goal of the act (even if the act is done "for its own sake") and the beliefs pertain to the circumstances and the likelihood of the end being attained by performing that particular act (or some "basic" act that underlies it) under those conditions. If the description of the act is sufficiently circumscribed, no distinction can be made at that level of description between the act's teleological structure -which is indispensable for it to be called an act at all -and its rationality. It is only when we enlarge the context to include other beliefs and wants, as well as the arguments that have served to bring them into existence, that the charge of irrationality can be made to stick.
It is frequently pointed out that in "Man is a rational animal," the word must be taken in a categorial sense for the dictum to come out true: taken in the evaluative sense, it is clearly false. The evaluative sense presupposes the categorial sense: to be either rational or irrational (evaluatively) is to be rational (categorially). In tewns of this familiar distinction, the thesis of minimal rationality is this:
It is a necessary condition of an intentional state or event's being describable as rational (categorially), that there be some true description under which it can properly (though perhaps vacuously) be said to be rational (evaluatively).
Two overblown but well-known dogmas are related to the application of this thesis to belief and to wanting. The dogma of phenomenalism aims to pare down the existential claims involved in (perceptual) beliefs until they are "incorrigible." The Platonic doctrine that no one desires the bad, or that desire is always sub specie boni, also depends on abstracting from the circumstances which make an actual want be of something really good or not. In both doctrines the grain of truth is this: each intentional state has a "formal" or "proper object" -respectively truth, and goodness. For a state to count as a belief, it must consist in the positing of a given (intentional) object as belonging to the proper object of belief-i.e. being true; for it to count as a want, it must consist in the positing of an intentional object as belonging to the proper object of wanting, i.e. being good. 6 In that minimal context, wants and beliefs have the structure of states that are categorially rational, but the restriction of context insulates them from any considerations in terms of which they can be said to be irrational. They are therefore (evaluatively) rational under those minimal descriptions.
Quine has offered a principle of translation which can be seen as an application of the present point of view. Why should I not allow myself to translate a native belief as something of the form l p & ~/?'? 7 Because an explicit contradiction could not intelligibly be posited as true. Such a proposition lacks the condition of minimal rationality, and therefore cannot be the content of any belief. The Freudian analysis of parapraxes can be viewed in the same light. Why are Freudian "slips" not merely accidents?
Because they can been as having the structure of minimally rational acts: if enough abstraction is allowed from the realistic circumstances in which the parapraxis occurs, and if certain assumptions can be made about the existence of a certain context of beliefs and wants, the event can be fitted into that context and ascribed the minimally rational structure which is definitive of an act. It does not matter that in a broader context the act is irrational.
Each of the above theses suggests a question to be raised in regard to the emotions: 1. Which sort of rationality can emotions aspire to? If, as Sartre has suggested, they were acts intended to effect a magical transformation of reality, they would presumably come under the category of strategic rationality. But Solomon (also inspired by Sartre) has recently suggested that they are species of judgement: if so they might be expected to fall under a cognitive criterion. 3. What application can be made to emotions of the principle of minimal rationality?
These questions are more easily separated in the asking than the answering. For we need to know something about the nature of objects of emotion before we can classify judgements of rationality with cognitive or strategic ones, or pin down cases of minimally rational emotions. Nevertheless, I shall start in a preliminary way with the first question.
The category of cognitive rationality calls for a further distinction. I have written as if it were judgements or beliefs in themselves that were up for assessment; but I have also indicated that the assessment is likely to be made in terms of the way that the belief was arrived at. Should we then, properly speaking, ascribe rationality to the belief itself, or to the argument or other process that has led up to it?
There is some temptation to think that rationality properly applies only to transitions. These, however, can only be assessed in the light of something like the probability of adequacy which they confer to the resultant state. In the case of inferences, "adequacy" is simply truth. We do not rate a transition -an argument or inference -rational if and only if it leads to true belief, but we do require at least that it be of a sort that generally tends to increase the likelihood of truth. It is therefore useful to stipulate the following extension of the notion of rationality: call "intrinsic rationality", or more briefly success, the property of the end state which rational transitions make more probable. In the case of actions, "success" is generally called just that: success. In belief it is called truth. In wants, success is actual desirability or goodness. I propose to extend this to emotions, and to call the success of an emotion "appropriateness." Plato, who first claimed that pleasure and pain, and emotions generally, could be assessed in a dimension of success separable from mere pleasantness, seems to have shocked practically everybody by calling it truth. The idea I want to defend is not so different; 8 but for two reasons I won't speak of the truth of emotions. One is that I have no wish to be unnecessarily provocative. A more important reason is that I do not want to beg the question whether the dimension of rationality appropriate to emotions is the cognitive, rather than the strategic, or whether it is in some important way different from both. The answer to that question will eventually emerge. So I shall stick with 'appropriateness'. And I shall say that:
an emotion is appropriate, if and only if the evoking object or situation warrants the emotion.
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This immediately suggests an objection: is there anything objectively in a situation -as opposed to the mere heart of the emoter -that can be said to warrant the emotion? The implied analogy is with perception: but in the case of perception there is a distinction between objective correctness and illusion. What is there, in the case of emotion, to correspond to this? 10 The objection may get additional impetus from remembering that the whole point of the Emotivist Theories of Ethics was to remove moral judgements from the realm of the factual. This was agreed on both by its advocates, who saw it as a virtue, and by its opponents, who rejected Emotivism on precisely that ground.
Let us then explore the parallel with perception. Consider the quality of redness. To be sure, it depends in part on the character of our receptors; in this sense redness, as a "secondary quality," differs from mass. The measurement of mass depends on our instruments and ultimately on our senses, but the property itself can be defined independently of any reference to our senses. This is not the case for red. On the other hand, red is not simply "in the mind:" it is not a matter of fantasy, an arbitrary projection from my consciousness. Nor can the quality of being red be denned exclusively in terms of an experience, a sensation: for in order to pin-point the sensation of red, we need a reference to standard conditions of observation by standard observers: the sensation of red is that caused by the sight of blood, by daylight, in a normal observer.
11 To this extent we might therefore say that colours, while they are monadic properties, depend for their existence on some relational ones. But there is no reason why such properties, any more than straightforwardly relational ones, cannot be objective. To claim otherwise is to confuse a property that depends for its existence on certain other, relational, ones, with one that is assigned without criteria at the whim of a subject. The latter would be really a property of the subject itself; of its purported bearer it would only be an intentional property, that is no property at all. The former, on the other hand, even if it were claimed to be really (covertly) dyadic, can quite legitimately generate a monadic property by dint of holding the second term (the "subject") constant. The normal observer in normal conditions plays just this role. This disposes of the claim that secondary qualities are less objective than primary ones.
A just objection, however, does remain: At best what has been said so far clears the way for there to be objective correlates of emotions: it does not establish that there must be some. But to make that further point, we cannot continue to discuss the nature of emotional rationality -our first "leading question" -in isolation from the other questions. I shall rest my hope of progress on two sets of considerations. The first is intended to make plausible the idea that there is a biological point to emotions, just as there is a biological point to our capacity to discriminate colours (in spite of the fact that from the physical or scientific point of view colours are very unimportant: they reveal absolutely nothing of the essential properties of matter.) 12 1 shall offer some speculations about what that biological point might be, and this will tell us something about the nature of emotional appropriateness. In the second set of considerations, I shall offer some thoughts about the origins and development of our capacity for emotional discrimination: this will involve characterizing the paradigm cases in which, in abstraction from context, the existence of a given emotion is a sufficient condition of its rationality. Thus each set of considerations will connect with one of the other two leading questions I have posed: the first, with the question of appropriateness, or the nature of the formal object of emotions, and the second, with the application of the principle of minimal rationality. We shall be led, in conclusion, to consider some essential limitations of a purely biological approach. Realizing the nature of these limitations -the dependence of emotions on the process of socializationwill round out the proffered sketch of the rationality of emotions.
WHAT ARE EMOTIONS FOR?
"What are emotions biologically for?" may seem an odd question to ask. But it is, I think, a question all the more urgent because of the prevalence of the view of emotions as disrupters rather than collaborators of rational activity. From the point of view of evolution, it is a question that is always appropriate: though it may not get a positive answer in every case. "Chance genetic drift," an answer which amounts to rejecting the question, may well explain something harmless such as the prevalence of a certain eye colour in a population. But when we are talking about something so often thought destructive, we must ask: how did we come by it? Why are we not the better off without it? and if we are, how come we're still here with it?
Let us try to imagine what it would be like to be without emotions. It is not easy to make the supposition clear in view of the close connection between emotion and motivation: it must not be confused with the supposition that we might be without wants. For I am still speaking of agents. I see two forms for this speculation to take. A being without emotion would either be some kind of Kantian angel or monster -with a computer brain and a pure rational Will, or else a Cartesian animal-machine, an ant, perhaps, in which every "want" is preprogrammed and every "belief simply a releasing cue for a specific response. My hunch here is that it is because we are neither one nor the other, "neither beast nor angel", that we have emotions as well as beliefs and desires. But a hunch is not an explanation.
What is it that animal-machine and Kantian angel have in common? I submit that it is complete determinacy: on the one hand by mechanisms, on the other by reason. In fact, of course, both are equally mythical beings: there are no animal-machines of the sort described, because of the fact of biological variability. Two individual ants, two individual viruses even, won't do exactly the same thing under every condition. But close enough: close enough in particular so that individual ants have no need of special clues to tell them how, from a repertoire of equally probable alternatives, other ants are likely to react. Ants, unlike primates, have no need for communicativeness of emotional expression. If ants emote, they need not know it of each other. But the more interesting impossibility concerns the angel. There, full predictability does not elude us because of angelic variability, but because there is no such thing as fully determinate rationality.
Consider the epistemic level. There are many issues on which logic gives no unique prescription. Logic suggests that in consistency we should avoid false beliefs and pursue true ones: "Don't believe an inconsistent set," but "Believe the consequences of your beliefs." Plausible as they are, these principles are not always compatible in their application; nor do they prescribe their own ordering. Thus even at the lowest level we require "policies that seem reasonable" to supplement hard logic. But the most important areas of indeterminacy have to do with what subjects to investigate, and what inductive rules to adopt. No logic determines salience: what to attend to, what to inquire about. And no inductive logic can make a strictly rational choice between, say, the extremes of "soft headedness" and "hard headedness." The terms are borrowed from the Theaetetus: you will recall that Plato (at 191 c) describes two sorts of "tablets" in the mind: soft ones that easily take impressions but lose them as fast, and hard ones that are difficult to scratch, but once imprinted hard to erase. Plato's problem was what statisticians now call the problem of the choice of significance level: how probable must it be that your hypothesis is true on the evidence, and how improbable must it be that it should be false on the evidence, before it is rational to accept it? Inductive logic does not tell us, and statistics offers only sophisticated rules of thumb.
The same goes for choices of strategies in the light of existing desires: there are choices that no rational calculation can make, because they are between alternatives that on rational calculation turn out the same. An obvious example is the choice between a minimax and a maximax strategy. In a situation where I can either act, with much to lose and as much to gain, or refrain, with nothing to gain or lose, the probabilities involved may be such that the expected desirabilities of the two are identical. Yet there is clearly a perceptible difference between the two options: minimize losses, or maximize gains. One can make up a principle here, of course, as one can for consistency or for induction. But no principle can claim to be dictated by rationality alone.
This suggests a hypothesis: the function of emotion is to fill gaps left by (mere wanting plus) "pure reason" in the determination of action and belief.
Consider how lago proceeds to make Othello jealous. His task is essentially to direct Othello's attention, to suggest questions to ask: "did Michael Cassio, when you woo'd my lady-Know of your love?" and then to insinuate that there are inferences to be drawn without specifying them himself, so that Othello exclaims:
By heaven, thou echoest me As if there were some monster in thy thought Too hideous to be shown ...
. (in iii)
Then more directly Iago advises: "Look to your wife." Once attention is thus directed, inferences which, before on the same evidence, would not even have been thought of, are experienced as compelling: "Farewell, the tranquil mind...." * In this example, the emotion is changed via the manipulation of attention. But such manipulation is not always possible. It can be blocked by the grip of a pre-existing emotion. Even where an emotion is already regnant, however, the order of causal accessibility of emotion and attention is not fixed; it depends in part, (for reasons I will sketch below in "Paradigm Scenarios"), on the historic origins of an individual's experience of and capacity for the emotions involved. As common-sense "psychologists" we learn to "play on" people's emotions-sometimes the more abusively for being more shrewd. Iago is a master psychologist in that sense: a con-man, which is to say, a sophist of the emotions. The con-man and the sophist differ in the emphasis they place on different methods, but there is some of the other in each. A sophist needs to divert attention from his most slippery arguments, and one way to do it is by manipulating emotion (the art of the political orator.) But a con-man must also be, like Iago, adept at "passing" bad arguments by making them look plausible. In the light of this example, the hypothesis for exploration can be restated thus:
Emotions are determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies. Before asking how this hypothesis can help with my three questions, let us survey a sample of applications, just to get the feel of what it is I am suggesting.
Item:
The hypothesis can help us to see the importance of the expression of emotion among members of a species whose behaviour is not highly stereotyped. To read the emotional configuration of another's body or face, is to have a guide to what they are likely to believe, attend to, and therefore want and do. Such dispositions tend to be given different names depending in part on their duration: a short one is an emotion, a longer one a sentiment, and a permanent one is called character. (Psychoanalysts recognize both the difference and the connection between such long and short term dispositions by distinguishing two sorts of pathology: "neurosis," and "character neurosis.")
We can also see why it has been tempting to assimilate emotions both to judgements and to desires. On my view, emotions ask the questions which judgement answers with beliefs: but as every committee chairman knows, questions have a good deal to do with the determination of answers: the rest can be done with innocuous facts. In this way emotions can be said to be judgements rather in the way that scientific paradigms might be said to be "judgements": they are what we see the world "in terms of." But they cannot be articulated propositions. Much the same reasons motivate their assimilation to desire (which is itself sometimes classed as an emotion.) For as long as we presuppose some basic or pre-existing desires, the directive power of "motivation" belongs to what controls attention, salience, and inference strategies preferred where logic leaves a choice.
Item: Emotions are often described as guiding the processes of reasoning-or distorting them, depending on the describer's assessment of their appropriateness. Indeed, this is in great part what all good novels are about. In extreme cases we think of reasoning as being distorted into self-deception: but there is seldom a sharp mistake in logic of which the self-deceiver can be accused. If my account is right, self-deception is not different in kind or mechanism from normal cases of reasoning about matters of concern. The difference may largely rest in the relation of apiece of reasoning to what is expected in the circumstances.
Consider for example the way that we are wont to discount experience for distance in space, time, or affection. It seems reasonable to do this, within vague bounds: but there are no rules of rationality that prescribe the rate of discount. The thought of our own death is subject to this discount, but in certain ("emotional") moments our attention shifts; we feel our mortality in a different way. These are rare moments of experience when we feel the truth of a commonplace, which is as different from what we call knowing it as the vision of waters upon the earth is different from the delirious vision of the water which cannot be had to cool the burning tongue.
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They illustrate that shifts of emotion are primarily shifts of salience.
Item: Although emotions are manipulators of reasoning, the experience of emotion tends to be an "intuitive" one: it is not easy to formulate reasons for one's shifts of attention. To be sure, there are great differences between types of emotion on this point: it applies least to indignation, for example; but many emotions find it hard to give their own reasons, even though they produce reasons of their own. This applies not just to the most diffuse or least "thought dependent," such as joy or depression: but also to those, like love or mistrust, that are specific in their targets and sometimes even loquacious about their propositional objects. Even these are often not given to much pretence of having been brought about by reasons: "1 can't explain: he just gives me the creeps." An explanation sometimes offered for this is that emotions are somatic phenomena; that they consist largely in autonomic reactions, of which the phenomenological component consists in dim awareness. A preferable explanation can be given in terms of the model I have sketched: paying attention to certain things is a source of reasons, but comes before them. Similarly, scientific paradigms, in Kuhn's sense, 14 are better at stimulating research in certain directions than at finding compelling and fair reasons for their own adoption. They are too "deep" for that, too unlike specific, easily formulated beliefs.
Item: Emotions have a very variable degree of adaptivity. Hence of course their reputation for being disruptive. There is bound to be a good deal of atavism, of various levels of antiquity, in the determinants of our emotions. And this means that they will be variously well adapted to the circumstances in which they are now likely to arise. On the present account this is to be expected: to be inclined to look to certain things may have a very different utility in different circumstances. Here as elsewhere, the overall usefulness of some device of nature is quite compatible with its noxiousness in particular cases. This is a point that was made by Descartes:
The utility of all the passions consists in their fortifying and perpetuating in the soul thoughts which it is good it should preserve ... And again, all the harm which they can cause consists in the fact that they fortify and conserve these thoughts more than necessary. (Passions of the Soul, 74).
Descartes here explicitly links the variable utility of emotions with what one might call their inertia.^5 But inertia is not, as on Descartes' view it should be, the general case. What we get instead are variable patterns of continuity and transformation between emotions. Here are some examples:
(a) In some cases, the discovery that an emotion was premised on a false belief, instead of simply cancelling the emotion, will transmute it into another. Indignation can turn into remorse upon finding that it was unjust; and we have all seen a parent punish a lost child when, on finding it, anxiety turned to anger. In such cases the focus of attention is not changed by the mere change of belief: so there is a kind of inertia of attention. But since the facts are now different, new features of the situation naturally become salient to the same attentive set, in turn provoking shifts in the dominant patterns of concern.
(b) In other cases, the emotion's habit of looking for certain sorts of facts and facilitating certain sorts of inference will simply focus on new targets: thus when Mrs. Farebrother learns that Lydgate is not the natural son of Bulstrode, she does not take this to be sufficient ground for ceasing to think ill of Bulstrode: "the report may be true of some other son."' 3 Here the emotion can be clearly seen as a disposition to ask certain questions.
(c) Conversely, there are cases where something comes to change that disposition without any change in the object or in any directly relevant belief. A friend of mine felt intimidated by a woman he met, apparently because of her character. Later he discovered that the woman had been his student: though not claiming to perceive any difference in her character, "I'm not afraid of her any more," he said, "because I have this maxim that you can't be afraid of students." From the point of view of ateacher, signs of intellectual threat are not salient, nor are they easily inferred. The story is a good illustration of the fact that emotions operate at the meta-level with respect to beliefs.
Item: These facts about emotional change are related to a more general point, about the voluntariness of emotions. In spite of the "irrationality of emotion" tradition, we commonly hold people responsible for their emotions. This seems to presuppose that emotions are at least to some extent in our power. The hypothesis I have offered suggests an explanation for the limited extent to which this is true.
Emotions, I have said, are in part patterns of attention. Therefore one might expect a change in patterns of attention to entail a change in emotion. I can't be very angry any more, if I notice none of your misdeeds, nor even infer to any when there is a doubt to be resolved. Now attention, to some degree, is in our power. But among the limitations to this control is a logical one, which results in its being a lot easier to attend at will than to withdraw one's attention at will. I can clearly keep in mind a target to be avoided: but if the avoidance sought is inattention, my efforts will be self-defeating. (This is the starting point of some of the notorious puzzles of self-deception.) So we may expect great difficulty in trying to get rid of an unwanted emotion, but more success in working ourselves into one. And indeed, these are familiar facts. It does me no good to tell myself how foolish I am to miss her: for the thought is an enemy agent, as it were, calculated to fix my thoughts on just what I should forget. I should forget her smile, her eyes, her perfect breasts ... The best course is to fall in love with someone else: "it'll take my mind off her." Or failing that, to hate her: directing my attention onto her betrayal, her levity, her heartlessness .... And the same goes for self-love: "11 estfacile de se hair," said Bernanos, "Le difficile est de s'oublier." I have been expanding and illustrating the idea that our emotions underlie our rational processes. This claim -this model of emotions and what at the most general level they are for -was introduced to make it plausible that there is some objectivity, related to biological significance, to the proper objects of emotions. But it is time to address the question directly. For it might well seem that the way emotions have been claimed to underlie rational processes does not argue for their susceptibility to rational assessment for themselves: either "intrinsically" or "in transition." Have I not shown merely that emotions are nonrational supplements to rationality, serving merely to ensure that rational processes will have determinate outcomes?
Yes, but not only that. It seems to be so only because we are strongly tempted to assume that only propositional states of the kinds familiar from the formulations of belief and desires can be assessed for rationality. But I have resisted the assimilation of emotions either to mere judgements or to desires: their formal or proper objects are different in kind, and their intentional objects may be too. This requires some explanation.
PARADIGM SCENARIOS
Classical writers on the emotions, from Descartes on, are fond of making lists of primitive emotions, then going on to show how the more complex are built out of those. The diversity in the resulting lists is warning enough that this is an unpromising strategy. And yet it cannot be denied that there are, in other animals as in human babies, modes of behaviour which we take to express something like human emotions. The determination of salience and preferred inference patterns cannot afford to wait for the development of full-fledged rationality. I think we can understand, in principle, how our repertoire of emotions gets built up, without positing a set of "primary emotions" that get combined like basic blocks or even mixed like primary colours. We do need a repertoire of primitive instinctual responses, but emotions are not mere responses. I suspect it works like this:
We are made familiar with the vocabulary of emotion by association with paradigm scenarios, drawn first from our daily life as small children, later reinforced by the stories and fairy tales to which we are exposed, and, later still, supplemented and refined by literature and art. Paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: first, a paradigm situation providing the characteristic objects of the emotion (where objects can be of various sorts, sometimes more suitably labelled "target," or "occasion") and second, a set of characteristic or "normal" responses to the situation. It is in large part in virtue of the response component of the scenarios that emotions are commonly held to motivate: though this is, in a way, back-to-front: for the emotion often takes its name from the response disposition and is only afterwards assumed to cause it. There is little doubt that a child is genetically programmed to respond in specific ways to the situational components of some paradigm scenarios. An essential part of education consists in identifying these responses, giving the child a name for them in the context of the scenario, and thus teaching it that it is experiencing a particular emotion. 16 The essential thought-dependency of certain emotions, and the lesser extent of that dependency in some of the more "primitive" ones (such as lust, or terror) is easily explained in terms of the kinds of paradigm scenarios to which they are related. If the paradigm scenario cannot be apprehended without complex linguistic skills, for example, we shall not expect to find in whoever lacks those skills an emotion specifically tuned to that scenario. That is why, as Iris Murdoch has put it, the most essential and fundamental aspect of culture is the study of literature, since this is an education in how to picture and understand human situations.
The way that paradigm scenarios fit into my central hypothesis should be obvious. Learning to "gestalt" situations in terms of such scenarios is learning to attend differentially to certain features of an actual situation, to inquire into the presence of further features of the scenario, and to make inferences that the scenario suggests. 18 Armed with the notion of paradigm scenarios, then, we can now return to the questions asked at the conclusion of our discussion of rationality.
A P P L I C A T I O N S T O O U R L E A D I N G Q U E S T I O N S
To start with the last: there i "s an obvious application to the question about minimal rationality. Since emotions are learned in terms of these paradigms, they cannot, at least within a given social context, be criticized for inappropriateness if they occur in response to the paradigm situation. Though we must here carefully distinguish the emotion itself from the response in behaviour which the scenario might involve: it does not follow from the rationality of the emotion evoked that the stock response will continue to be seen as rational. Where the response is an action or strategy it needs to be assessed in its own terms. It may be that a further narrowing of the context is needed before the minimal rationality of the behaviour is guaranteed. A spouse witnessing sexual intercourse between their spouse and another person may react with jealousy and rage, and in so far as the situation belongs to the paradigm scenario for jealousy, the emotion must be counted appropriate. But even if the original scenario, as learned, involves the response of murdering the parties, this will not necessarily make the action rational. That act will have its own minimal rationality as an extreme act of revenge: but the mere existence of the scenario will not determine whether extreme revenge is rational in cases of jealous rage. Nevertheless, this account raises a problem. It appears to suggest that the rationality of an emotion is fixed irretrievably by its origins in socialization, and that nothing can affect the appropriateness of an emotion provided the evoking situation fits the paradigm. What then of the changes in emotional dispositions that we call "maturing emotionally"? And what of the possibility of striving for greater emotional rationality? Can we not repudiate certain scenarios altogether -in an effort, for example, to be rid of sexist attitudes and emotions?
This objection amounts to much the same as the charge, justly laid against a certain kind of "Oxford philosophy" a couple of decades ago, of misusing the notion of paradigm. But that a concept is learned in a given context is not the end of the matter. It does not mean that the concept cannot be revised and refined; that our understanding of it cannot be deepened to the point where we are able to ask without contradiction whether it is appropriate to the paradigm itself. The smiling bride was the paradigm of a free agent: we might well teach the concept in terms of this example. But that should not prevent us from analysing the concept and then applying it from a broader perspective to the paradigm itself: but is she really free? When the paradigm is questioned in this way, it is invariably in the light of a wider range of considerations than are available when the case is viewed in isolation. The concept of minimal rationality does not require that the state or event in question be describable as (evaluatively) rational in the light of all wider perspectives. Paradigms can be revised in the light of other, competing paradigms that are seen also to be applicable to the situation at hand: though the emotion will retain its basic intelligibility (its minimal rationality) provided it can be seen in the light of its own, narrowest, proper scenario. Further, a scenario can become completely inert, obsolete: this will take place if every situation that fitted the original scenario comes to be seen as fitting another (set of) scenario(s), one that is preferable or more congenial when the situation is viewed from a more comprehensive perspective. 19 The attempt to restructure one's emotions by "consciousness raising" is based on this possibility -without which, I suspect, there could be no such thing as moral development.
Nevertheless, an objector might insist, in what sense can we maintain that the process of one paradigm's being supplanted by another is rational? And to what extent can it be maintained that there is any objectivity involved here? Am I not saying that attitudes, dispositions, and habits may change unaccountably, since what leads to change -what one might barbarously call "emotional re-gestalting" -is simply beyond the pale of rationality? Do emotions not remain as subjective after as before such changes?
Mostly, no. Again the tendency to think so springs from an unrealistic picture of the rationality of belief changes, and from unwarranted standards for "objectivity." I said that an emotion is appropriate (or minimally so) in a given situation if and only if that situation is relevantly similar to, can accurately be "gestalted" as, the situation of a suitable paradigm scenario. But there is no requirement that situation and response not also be similar to some other scenarios. Indeed, such a requirement would be incoherent. Emotions, like other perceptual Gestalts, are not necessarily compatible: hence although there are cases where emotions mix, in varying proportions, we can also expect a class of cases where one Gestalt, one emotion, crowds out another. To be sure, what can be seen as similar to a given scenario admits of a certain amount of leeway. Can the complicated friendships of sophisticated Bloomsburyites adequately be seen as instantiating "the Eternal Triangle," for example, or would that scenario be truly stifled, in those circles, by the meta-scenario in which it appears as vulgar"? To this extent, emotions and their adequacy to their objects, or rationality, cannot be assessed with mathematical precision. But on the other hand not just anything goes, either, as those have learned to their regret, who have attempted to "rationalize" their lives in terms of invented scenarios insufficiently rooted in human nature and the facts of life. True irrationality of emotion involves the perception of a situation in terms of a scenario which it does not objectively resemble: in such cases we are well advised to see unconscious links and transformation rules that have turned one situation into another. Emotional irrationality is a matter of muddled scenarios: a loss of reality, intensified in neurosis and extreme in psychosis. The minimal rationality of those emotions must be sought in terms of the scenario unconsciously evoked: thus psychotherapy typically looks for clues to the transformation in free association; and it is a sound principle of therapy not to rest in the search for the original scenario until the emotion inappropriately evoked is in this way accounted for as minimally rational.
At this point yet another objection may occur to you. What I have tried to describe under the names of "adequacy," "success" and "appropriateness" clearly belongs in the cognitive rather than the strategic category of rationality. But I distinguished two kinds of cognitive rationality, and what I have said has clear application only to what I called rationality by extension, or "success." It is the analogue of truth, not of validity of argument. It has also been said to underlie transitions between beliefs and/or desires by selecting the inductive rules involved in such transitions. But can the term "rationality" really apply to transitions from one emotion to another? I think it can: and I have already given examples of such "transitions." But it must be pointed out that in this regard emotional rationality is more akin to the strategic kind. For just as there are no strategic arguments that consist exclusively in premises and conclusions referring to wants (for there must also be factual premises, or ones that are relevant to belief), so emotions do not reason to other emotions without more conventionally cognitive premises. The reason for this is that the chief instrument of criticism with respect to emotions, consists in the working out of consequences of the application of a given scenario, in confrontation with others that may also be applicable. And these consequences as well as the applicability of different scenarios, are matters of empirical fact in a common-or-garden sense. This is analogous to the way we debate about wants: we examine what, under the prevalent conditions, would be the effects of acting on some of our wants, with relation to our other wants. In this way we work out hierarchies -some temporary, just for the purposes of an occasion of deliberation, and some more permanent -among our wants and values. So with emotions: the chief task of establishing rational transitions between emotions, and rational emotional responses to situations where several alternatives compete, involves determining hierarchies among applicable scenarios. To pick another example from a rich mine, consider how Will Ladislaw felt that his dislike was flourishing at the expense of his gratitude and spent much inward discourse in justifying this dislike.
Part of that inward discourse goes like this:
He was much obliged to Casaubon in the past, but really the act of marrying his wife was a set-off against the obligation. It was a question whether gratitude which refers to what is done for one's self ought not to give way to indignation at what is done against another.
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The hierarchies and orders of precedence among emotions are, in a given culture, fixed to a great extent. They represent that aspect of the ideology of a culture which prescribes dispositions of character as virtues -often different for different social classes, ages, and sexes. 20 For this reason, one who has succeeded in modifying the usual hierarchy may find herself not merely vilified as immoral by those who make the conventional assumptions, but literally not understood. Thus Ms. Magazine recently reprinted an item, from a counselling column, in which a doctor advised:
Mothers who force weaning early and abruptly may experience anger at the loss of the intimate relationship with the nursing child. Some women may express this anger by returning to work or taking a vacation.
21 < Of course, in such cases, the allegation of lack of understanding is mutual: which is what we should expect from parties interpreting a situation in terms of different ideologies or scenarios. The application of a scenario to a real situation makes the "reasonable" hierarchy of emotions seem so obvious, that the likely mutual charge is not merely misunderstanding but self-deception. The fact that it is mutual, however, in no way implies that there is no correctness in the matter.
SUMMARY
It is time to recapitulate and conclude. I began by offering, with little argument, what I take to be plausible theses about the conditions for ascription of rationality. These conditions suggested three "leading questions," which could not be easily separated in the course of the discussion, but to which I can now summarize one by one the answers that have emerged.
1. The first question was whether the rationality of emotions was of the cognitive or the strategic kjnd. On this I conclude that it is sufficiently close to the cognitive type in admitting a close analogue of truth, a distinct species of intrinsic "success" -claims about the subjectivity of emotions notwithstanding. Their mode of objectivity is, to be sure, one that is relative to human nature, its characteristic inclinations and responses. This objectivity is grounded in paradigm scenarios which are at the origin of our capacity for specific emotions. I speculated that their biological function is to take up the slack in the rational determination of judgement and desire, by fixing salience of objects of attention and inquiry, and preferred inference patterns. In this way emotions remain sui generis: they are not to be identified with a species of judgement. Indeed, although their mode of rationality is closely analogous to the cognitive in respect of their intrinsic "success," the rationality of transitions among emotions is more akin to the strategic kind. This view therefore nicely accounts for, while still resisting, the opposed temptations to assimilate emotions to something else, namely beliefs or desires.
2. The second question concerned the objects of emotions and their relation to proper or formal objects. I have thrown a blanket, quite deliberately, over the complications of the analysis of objects, by the use of the term "evoking situation." But I have attempted to explain the role of the formal objects of emotions by reference to the paradigm scenarios in terms of which emotions are learnt. It is in terms of the relation between the evoking situation and the formal object -the quality that is tied to the paradigm situation -that the appropriateness or intrinsic rationality of an emotion is assessed.
3. The detail of how this is done is subject to the condition described in answer to the third question: I claimed that for any intentional state amenable to assessment for rationality, it must be possible to circumscribe the context of the state to such an extent that it appears "minimally rational." The application of this to emotions is this: in terms of the paradigm scenario alone, the emotion that fits it is, by definition rational. But the "all-things-considered" assessment of an emotion is determined in a complicated way: first, by determining whether the evoking situation is actually an instantiation of the paradigm, and secondly, by confronting it with other applicable paradigms and working out the relations of compatibility, incompatibility, and hierarchic dominance between the relevant scenarios. This complicated process is at the centre of our moral life. Philebus" (forthcoming). 9 Some reasons will later become apparent for speaking of 'evoking situations'. But one reason must be acknowledged right away: it is that I do not propose in this paper to give a typology or analysis of objects of emotion. The phrase "evoking situation" leaves matters intentionally vague in this regard. 10 The view that emotions are purely subjective, and thus lack objective correlates and can be assessed for rationality only ija the strategic sense, is curiously coupled with the view that they are judgements in Solomon, op. cit. There are difficult and fascinating questions here, about the extent to which literature can invent scenarios that when applied to one's own life result in "authentic" emotions. Sociobiology and psychoanalysis are both, from different points of view, concerned with this question. The first asks: how many of the familiar scenarios can be traced to genetically programmed dispositions, and how much does this matter to the malleability of human emotions and social organization? The latter asks: what is "genuine" sublimation, and what "mere" defence mechanism? 18 Inference-making on the basis of appropriate scenarios is an important part of the psychoanalyst's art. But note that such inferences can be made in two ways: one consists in fitting the situation of the patient into a plausible scenario ("an oedipal problem'', for instance), and making "by the book" the inference that this implies. The other way involves/ee/mg an emotion that seems to spring from a certain scenario, and allowing inferences to be guided by that emotion in the normal way. The second method is the one every good analyst strives for, though it obviously involves great risks if the therapist has
